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Introduction
From March to October 2016 recurring attempts were made at blocking access to the
official website of the organisation Black Lives Matter.1 An Anonymous-affiliated
team calling itself ‘Ghost Squad’ took responsibility for some of them, causing
confusion on the part of commentators.2 For many, it was unclear how to reconcile
the thrust of these attacks with the political orientation of earlier actions of
Anonymous such as campaigns against Scientology and in support of Julian Assange.
Ghost Squad, specifically, had earlier targeted the website of the Ku Klux Klan. Yet in
a video posted on May 2 on a YouTube channel called @anonymous_exposes_racism,
the group explained that they had “seen people in your movement on the streets and
social media chanting and posting slogans such as ‘Kill Whitey,’ ’Death to the slave
masters’ and other objectionable statements,” and had, therefore, decided to take
action: “We will not tolerate racist behaviour and hate speech from your movement
or any other organization any more than we do from the KKK.”3 Earlier, an account
called, “_s1iege” had tweeted screenshots of an ongoing Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack along with the hashtag #OPAllLivesMatter.4
These events in 2016 raise many complex questions relating to the nature of
online activism and to the specific circumstances of the fight for racial justice in the
US.5 While the full scope of these questions cannot be covered here, the attacks against
Black Lives Matter provide an exemplary point of entry for thinking about changes in
DDoS attacks as a political tactic. Blocking access to websites of political opponents

Corin Faife, “The DDoS Vigilantes Trying to Silence Black Lives Matter”, Ars Technica, December 14,
2016,
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/12/hack_attacks_on_black_
lives_matter/.
2
Catalin Cimpanu, “Anonymous Ghost Squad Hackers Take Down Black Lives Matter Website”,
Softpedia, May 1, 2016, https://news.softpedia.com/news/anonymous-ghost-squad-hackers-takedown-black-lives-matter-website-503579.shtml.
3
anonymous exposes racism, “Anonymous Calls out #BlackLivesMatter for Anti-White Racism,”
YouTube Video, 3:01. May 3, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDXsInz9jz8.
4
Anonymous (@_s1ege), “#OpAllLivesMatter #GhostSquadHackers blacklivesmatter.com #Defaced
and #Ddos’d ~s1ege” Twitter, April 30, 2016, https://twitter.com/_s1ege/status
/726206708473847809.
5
For investigations of these aspects, see Amber M. Hamilton, ‘A Genealogy of Critical Race and Digital
Studies: Past, Present, and Future’, Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 6, no. 3 (2020): 292-301; Sarah J.
Jackson, Moya Bailey, and Brooke Foucault Welles, #HashtagActivism: Networks of Race and Gender
Justice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2020); Marcia Mundt, Karen Ross, and Charla M Burnett,
‘Scaling Social Movements Through Social Media: The Case of Black Lives Matter’, Social Media +
Society 4, no. 4 (2018), doi.org/10.1177/2056305118807911.
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by means of DDoS attacks has long been considered a key tactic of online activism.6
It represents a specific kind of induced crisis of communication that causes disruption
in the flow of communication, thereby providing an opportunity to focus attention
on certain issues.7 However, as the example of Ghost Squad demonstrates, it is also a
polyvalent tactic in the sense that the political (or commercial, criminal or plain
malevolent) purposes affiliated with it can diverge widely and are prone to sudden
shifts of political orientation.
One development that is especially apparent when considering the events in
2016 is that DDoS attacks have become a more enduring phenomenon. From early
campaigns, which in many ways resembled traditional forms of political activism,
involving a multitude of engaged people causing temporary disruptions that lasted for
some hours or days, DDoS has turned into sustained cascades of highly automated
attacks that can last for several months.
The aim of this paper is to spell out the consequences of this shift from DDoS
as short-lived events to enduring phenomenon. The core argument is that this shift of
temporality has repercussions on the distributional layers of internet infrastructure
that have escaped the attention of existing scholarship on DDoS as an activist tactic.
This point will be developed through three steps. First, the paper provides a technical
overview of developments in the DDoS landscape. Secondly, this overview is related
to established positions and periodisations in DDoS research. Thirdly, the discussion
extends towards infrastructure studies in order to focus on the relationship between
breakdown and visibility. The paper concludes by calling for a stronger engagement
with the temporal aspects of recurring communication crises in general and DDoS
attacks in particular.
DDoS – Technical Developments
A DDoS attack seeks to exhaust the capacity of a web server by overwhelming it with
requests, thus rendering content inaccessible. Under normal working conditions, a
request to a server, initiated by a user, prompts that server to send the requested data.
During a successful DDoS attack, a server is unable to distinguish between legitimate
requests by regular users and requests that are sent with the purpose of bringing the
server down. In trying to fulfil all requests, the server and/or the network eventually
meet capacity limits, which means that legitimate requests receive error responses.
Molly Sauter, The Coming Swarm. DDoS Actions, Hacktivism, and Civil Disobedience on the Internet (New
York; London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).
7
Tim Jordan and Paul Taylor, Hacktivism and Cyberwars: Rebels with a Cause? (London; New York:
Routledge, 2004), 75-82.
6

communication+1 Vol. 8 [2021], Iss. 1, Article 5
2

Röhle / DDoS: From Activist Event to Perpetual Crisis

Usually, DDoS attacks do not affect the data that is stored on a server, but rather
make it temporarily inaccessible. Yet, depending on the scale of the attack, it can take
a considerable amount of time and resources to restore the functionality of the system.
Denial of Service has a long legacy as a technique for disturbing online
communication and a wide range of different strategies have been developed and
implemented.8 Many of these approaches are well known in the field of computer
science and there is an equally active development of counter-strategies for defending
servers and networks against them.9 A key factor in these strategies is the ability to
identify patterns in DDoS attack traffic, since such patterns can be used as the basis
for developing filtering and blocking rules, as well as more flexible traffic management
mechanisms based on Machine Learning.10 At the same time, there is a constant search
for vulnerabilities in online systems that can be exploited for expanding DDoS
capabilities. The proliferation of connected devices commonly referred to as the
Internet of Things is especially prone to such exploitation, since these devices often
lack adequate security features.11
The simplest versions of DDoS that rely on sending large numbers of identical
requests, so-called volumetric attacks, often produce easily identifiable traffic
patterns, which is why most websites today are effectively defended against them.
More advanced versions of DDoS rely on application layer attacks. These are based on
a strategy where requests are sent in ways that mimic the behaviour of regular users,
making it difficult to identify and filter out attack traffic. Two popular kinds of
application layer attacks are HTTP flood and reflection attacks. An HTTP flood can
be initiated by different kinds of software, from simple scripts to more elaborate and
established techniques, where requests for large amounts of data are sent at longer
intervals. Some of these techniques are comparatively easy to defend against, since
they involve identifiable combinations of IP addresses and user agents that can be
blocked. Also, many systems serve cached versions of frequently requested files, which
reduces the load on servers and, thus, protects them against simple HTTP floods –
Laura DeNardis, “A History of Internet Security”, in The History of Information Security: A
Comprehensive Handbook, ed. Karl de Leeuw and Jan Bergstra (Amsterdam, London: Elsevier, 2007),
681-704.
9
Sajal Bhatia, Sunny Behal, and Irfan Ahmed, “Distributed Denial of Service Attacks and Defense
Mechanisms: Current Landscape and Future Directions”, in Versatile Cybersecurity, ed. Mauro Conti,
Gaurav Somani, and Radha Poovendran (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2018), 55-97.
10
Kian Son Hoon et al., “Critical Review of Machine Learning Approaches to Apply Big Data Analytics
in DDoS Forensics”, in 2018 International Conference on Computer Communication and Informatics
(ICCCI), 2018, 1-5. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCI.2018.8441286.
11
Constantinos Kolias et al., “DDoS in the IoT: Mirai and Other Botnets”, Computer 50, no. 7 (2017): 8084.
8
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which again has triggered the development of counterstrategies on the part of
attackers.
Reflection attacks rely on exploiting specific vulnerabilities of systems in
order to prompt them to send requests to a target server. Even more advantageous for
an attacker are systems that not only reflect, but also amplify traffic, i.e. that send
(sometimes considerably) larger amounts of traffic to the target than the attacker sent
to the system, thus amplifying bandwidth resources.12 Beyond the exploitation of such
functionalities and vulnerabilities, the spread of malware allows attackers to take
complete control over a system, and then instruct them to send requests to a target
server or a reflection server. Compromised devices can be gathered into botnets,
which receive their instructions from command and control servers. The challenge for
the bot herder is then to distribute malware as efficiently as possible, to establish
reliant and secure communication to the command and control server, to secure the
botnet against being taken over by others and to make it difficult to track down the
command and control server that issues instructions.13
The example of the DDoS attack against Black Lives Matter illustrates how
these developments play out in practice. As a detailed technical investigation shows,14
botnet commands in this case could be traced back to servers that were rented
temporarily from Digital Ocean, a company offering Virtual Private Services and
hosted by DMZHOST, a hosting company that keeps the identity of its clients secret.
Yet, even if it were possible to identify the clients of these companies, it is not unlikely
that they would turn out to be a commercial entity offering DDoS as a service. These
services are marketed openly on the web, thinly disguised as “booters” or “stressers”
that website owners can use to test the resilience of their systems.15

12

13

14

15

Kulvinder Singh and Ajit Singh, “Memcached DDoS Exploits: Operations, Vulnerabilities,
Preventions and Mitigations”, in 2018 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Computing, Communication
and
Security
(ICCCS),
2018,
171-79,
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/
8586810.
Pascal Geenens, “IoT Botnets. The Journey So Far and the Road Ahead”, in Botnets: Architectures,
Countermeasures, and Challenges, ed. Georgios Kambourakis et al. (New York: CRC Press, 2020), 33100.
Seamus Tuohy, “Botnet Attack Analysis of Deflect Protected Website Blacklivesmatter.com”,
eQualitie, December 14, 2016, https://equalit.ie/en/deflect-labs-report-3-3d/.
Santanna, José Jair, “DDoS-as-a-Service: Investigating Booter Websites” (PhD diss., University of
Twente, 2017), https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/ddos-as-a-service-investigating-booterwebsites.

communication+1 Vol. 8 [2021], Iss. 1, Article 5
4

Röhle / DDoS: From Activist Event to Perpetual Crisis

From this – very rough – sketch of developments in the DDoS landscape, three
aspects can be singled out as especially pertinent when it comes to DDoS as a political
tactic:
1. Complexity of motives
The use of reflection tactics, botnets, command and control servers, virtual private
services, etc., increases the distance between the attacker and the target, rendering the
attribution of attacks ever more difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, performing a
DDoS attack involves very little risk of being exposed. However, the different layers
of the attack infrastructure are also characterised by a functional differentiation
which can be tied to different motives of the involved actors. Some parts, such as
commercial booter services or virtual private services, can be primarily driven by
financial gain, whereas other parts, such as malware development, can be primarily
fuelled by reputation in hacker circles; others still can be based on political motives,
both grass-root activist or state-sponsored.16 The current DDoS landscape is thus
characterised by a growing complexity of interlinked motives on different levels of
the attack infrastructure.
2. Automation and consolidation
The use of botnets represents one aspects of a tendency to automate and consolidate
DDoS attack capabilities. Both the identification of vulnerable devices and their
recruitment into botnets are processes that are increasingly automated, minimising
the manual effort involved in being a bot herder. Increasing automation implies that
the administration of these services is becoming less laborious and that there is
increased competition between different providers, driving prices down. The
resulting availability of pre-packaged attack capabilities as a service means that it
requires neither technical expertise nor established contacts nor substantial funds to
launch attacks against political opponents. In the words of the technical report on the
attacks against Black Lives Matter: “Silencing online voices is becoming ever easier
and cheaper on the Internet.”17

Some authors seek to identify causal historical trajectories from hacktivism to other forms of DDoS,
e.g., Tracey Caldwell, “Hacktivism Goes Hardcore”, Network Security 2015, no. 5 (1 May 2015): 12-17.
The argument here does not follow this line of reasoning, but rather focuses on the intermingling of
different motives on different functional layers.
17
Tuohy, “Botnet Attack Analysis of Deflect Protected Website Blacklivesmatter.com”.
16
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3. Reliance on professional protection
With the web becoming an increasingly hostile environment, there is a constant risk
that attempts will be made at blocking access to the online presence of activist
organisations whenever content or actions are perceived as controversial by others.18
Without professional protection, even simpler attacks have the potential of blocking
access to content. This means that activist organisations have to take the possibility
of attacks into account and prepare accordingly by soliciting protection from
professional providers of IT security. However, relying on these services also means
being at the mercy of a provider’s internal policies and business objectives.19
Taken together, these three developments suggest an ongoing qualitative shift
of DDoS from exceptional disruptions that can work in favour of activists’ political
purposes to a situation where DDoS becomes part of the infrastructural conditions of
online activism. This shift raises crucial questions about power relations in the digital
realm: Under what circumstances can DDoS be perceived as a tactic for activists to
unbalance prevailing asymmetries of power and under which circumstances does it
instead serve to stabilise such asymmetries or contribute to the establishment of new
ones?

Phases of Hacktivism
Political DDoS attacks (or DDoS actions as Sauter prefers to call them20), especially
those performed by Anonymous, are usually considered as part of a broader history
of hacktivism. In a recent overview over hacktivism research, Romagna offers a precise

For an early empirical investigation from this perspective, see Ethan Zuckerman et al., “Distributed
Denial of Service Attacks Against Independent Media and Human Rights Sites” (The Berkman
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, December 2010),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.harvard.edu/files/2010_DDoS_Attacks_Human_Rights_and_
Media.pdf, 10.
19
A case that has been the subject of substantial debate, both in technical and legal circles, was
Cloudflare’s decision to terminate its services for the neo-nazi site, “The Daily Stormer,” in 2017, see
Steven Johnson, “Inside Cloudflare’s Decision to Let an Extremist Stronghold Burn”, Wired, 16
January, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/free-speech-issue-cloudflare/; Kate Klonick, “The
Terrifying Power of Internet Censors”, The New York Times, 13 September, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/opinion/cloudflare-daily-stormer-charlottesville.html.
20
Sauter, The Coming Swarm.
18
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definition of the term as well as a synthesis of periodisations suggested in various
historical accounts. Incorporating previous definitions,21 he defines hacktivism as,
the sum of ideologies, individual and collective actions typical of
traditional activism, applied in cyberspace using hacking techniques,
while addressing or exploiting network infrastructure’s technical and
ontological features, with the final goal of reaching a sociopolitical
change in society.22
According to Romagna, hacktivism can be placed in between cyberattacks that have
permanently destructive consequences and less invasive forms of cyberactivism that
primarily rely on disseminating information. Hacktivism involves actual hacking
practices, yet with a merely temporary disruptive impact.
Romagna suggests a distinction between three different phases of hacktivism
based on changes in normative, organisational and technological aspects. The first
phase (from late 1980s to early 2000s) is characterised by the expansion of hacking
practices from the specific concerns of the hacking community itself to wider political
issues. A prominent example indicating this development is Floodnet: a DDoS
software developed by the Electronic Disturbance Theater in 1998 in order to raise
attention for the cause of the Zapatistas in Mexico. As Sauter points out in a more
detailed analysis of these developments, the extension of hacking practices into more
broad-ranging politics did not come without frictions; for example, when silencing
political opponents clashed with ideals of a “free flow of information” that was
considered central to hacker culture.23 Karatzogianni highlights the central role of
hacktivism in different “ethnoreligious struggles” with patriotic or nationalist agendas
during this phase.24
The second phase, from 2003 onwards, is characterised by the rise of
Anonymous. While Anonymous remains an amorphous organisational formation that

Stefania Milan, “Hacktivism as a Radical Media Practice”, in The Routledge Companion to Alternative
and Community Media, ed. Chris Atton (New York: Routledge, 2015), 550-60; Dorothy E. Denning,
“Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy”,
in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David F.
Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 239-88.
22
Marco Romagna, “Evolution of Hacktivism: From Origins to Now”, in From Sit-Ins to #revolutions:
Media and the Changing Nature of Protests, ed. Olivia Guntarik and Victoria Grieve-Williams (New
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 65-76, 65.
23
Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 47.
24
Athina Karatzogianni, Firebrand Waves of Digital Activism 1994-2014 (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2015).
21
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is difficult to categorise25, Romagna sees its growing importance during this phase as
a sign of consolidation. The organisational form of hacktivism shifts from smaller,
clandestine hacker groups to a larger collective that resembles social movements and
with successful strategies for gaining media attention.26 However, the “patriotic”
strand of hacktivism also remains relevant in this phase, with the targeting of Estonian
websites in 2007 as a prominent example. The planned transfer of a Russian
monument triggered a surge of DDoS attacks against Estonian publications, banks
and government websites.27 The case highlighted the vulnerability of internet
infrastructure, eventually leading to the establishment of the NATO Cooperative
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn.28 It is also an example of DDoS attacks
where it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between “grass-roots”
hacktivism and state-sponsored attacks.
The third phase is characterised by diversification. What sets this phase apart
from the second, according to Romagna, is that it becomes less of a priority to involve
average internet users. Whereas hacktivism software during the second phase was
often designed to lower the threshold for participation, the third phase is
characterised by small expert teams, some of them with loose affiliation to
Anonymous, cooperating in varying constellations. In terms of values, there is a
tendency towards particular forms of “vigilante justice”29 against particular targets,
rather than concerted efforts to align with broader sociopolitical agendas.30 Again, the
patriotic strand of hacktivism prevails in this phase, often in reaction to specific
geopolitical tensions or conflicts.
Phases of DDoS: Technological developments
While shifts in values and organisational forms are key factors in describing the
historical development of hacktivism more broadly, Desiriis suggests that

E. Gabriella Coleman, Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous (London, New
York: Verso, 2014); Carolin Wiedemann, “Between Swarm, Network, and Multitude: Anonymous
and the Infrastructures of the Common”, Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory 15, no. 3 (2 September
2014): 309-26.
26
Romagna, “Evolution of Hacktivism: From Origins to Now”, 72.
27
Finn Brunton, Spam: A Shadow History of the Internet, Infrastructures (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
MIT Press, 2013), 188-190.
28
Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School”,
International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2009): 1155-75.
29
Romagna, ”Evolution of Hacktivism: From Origins to Now”, 75.
30
In this sense, the DDoS attack against Black Lives Matter mentioned in the beginning fits this
description well.
25
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technological developments are central to identifying different phases in the
development of DDoS specifically.31
Some of the first political DDoS attacks, such as the “netstrike” against Strano
in 1995 and the “Deportation Class” action against Lufthansa in 2001,33 relied on users
who manually and repeatedly sent requests to the targeted server by reloading a
website. As Sauter shows, this first phase was quickly superseded by methods where
the sending of requests was automatically performed by software such as the Floodnet
software used in the Zapatista campaigns.34 Many DDoS actions performed by
Anonymous involved a software called the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) that, once
installed on a user’s computer, could be instructed to send large amounts of requests
to a target server.35
32

The third phase in Desiriis’ periodisation of the technological development of
DDoS is characterised by the increasing involvement of botnets. The most prominent
example for this phase is a malware called Mirai, which succeeded in infecting huge
numbers of low-end Internet of Things devices, such as security cameras, video
recorders and routers, in 2016.36 This botnet resulted in some of the largest DDoS
attacks to date, including an attack on DynDNS that caused major websites including
Twitter, The New York Times, Reddit and Netflix to become inaccessible for several
hours at a time. Within the course of a few months, similar attacks based on Mirai
botnets were launched against telecommunication companies and media
organisations, as well as blogs of individual journalists.37
Functionally, there are similarities between sending requests in an automated
way via software like the LOIC and a botnet like the one assembled by Mirai. In each
case, a network of computing devices is made to adhere to instructions that are issued
from a specific location (a command and control server in the case of botnets, an IRC
chat channel controlled by Anonymous in the case of LOIC), which makes it possible
Marco Deseriis, “Hacktivism: On the Use of Botnets in Cyberattacks”, Theory, Culture & Society 34,
no. 4 (July 2017): 131-52.
32
Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 50.
33
Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 53-54; Ricardo Dominguez, “Electronic Civil Disobedience Post-9/11”,
Third Text 22, no. 5 (2008): 661-70, 662-667.
34
Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 109-113.
35
Coleman, Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy, 133-140; Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 113-133.
36
Garrett M. Graff, “How a Dorm Room Minecraft Scam Brought Down the Internet”, Wired,
December 13, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/mirai-botnet-minecraft-scam-brought-down-theinternet/.
37
Robinson Meyer and Adrienne LaFrance, “When the Entire Internet Seems to Break at Once”, The
Atlantic,
October
21,
2016,
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/
10/when-the-entire-internet-seems-to-break-at-once/504956/.
31
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to synchronise these devices’ resources in order to target a server and overwhelm its
capacities. However, while the LOIC, to varying degrees, relied on the voluntary
contribution of bandwidth and computing power of those using the software, botnets
consist of devices that are used for these purposes without the consent of their owners.
Effectivity and Legitimacy of DDoS
There is no doubt that the growing use of non-voluntary botnets does make a
significant difference in terms of the effectivity of DDoS attacks. Due to
improvements in web security, it is questionable whether highly publicised events
such as Anonymous’ Operation Payback in 2010 would have had any noticeable effect
without their involvement.38 However, there is an ongoing debate whether it also
makes a difference in terms of legitimacy whether users have clearly signalled their
consent to the use of their equipment (as in the case of the LOIC) or whether it is
used in a non-voluntary way, after being infected by malware. Sauter points out that
the question of whether to automate server requests was already prevalent during the
first phase of DDoS actions and that some technical possibilities were actively
disregarded in order to “maintain a one-to-one participant to signal ratio.”39
For many scholars involved in hacktivism research, the legitimacy of DDoS
hinges on the question of whether it should be considered a form of civil disobedience.
Delmas is sceptical about including any form of hacktivism in this category since it
would lower the level of commitment that she considers central to civil disobedience.40
Sauter, on the other hand, makes an elaborate case for including DDoS under the
category of civil disobedience by comparing it to offline forms of activism and
developing a set of criteria for assessing the legitimacy of specific actions. One of these
criteria concerns the use of non-voluntary botnets, which they regard as “a grossly
unethical action”41 that impacts negatively on legitimate forms of activism. Celikates
and de Zeeuw make the opposite case, arguing that non-voluntary botnets should be
considered as legitimate forms of civil disobedience, since they reflect a

Candice Delmas, “Is Hacktivism the New Civil Disobedience?”, Raisons Politiques, no. 1 (2018): 63-81,
70; Deseriis, “Hacktivism”, 144; Parmy Olson, We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of Lulzsec,
Anonymous, and the Global Cyber Insurgency (New York: Little, Brown and Co, 2012), 117.
39
Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 44.
40
Delmas, “Is Hacktivism the New Civil Disobedience?”, 69.
41
Sauter, The Coming Swarm, 132.
38
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transformation of activist strategies towards “algorithmic resistance.”42 Fordyce makes
a similar case involving a historical-critical reading of the concept of the automaton.43
Desiriis discusses the use of non-voluntary botnets from an ethical
perspective, highlighting both the absence of user consent and the problem of
intransparency when decisions about targets are delegated to a small “techno-elite.”44
However, rather than engaging in the debate about legitimacy and civil disobedience,
he primarily treats botnets as a case in order to explore how the hybridity of
contemporary socio-technical assemblages impacts upon anthropocentric notions of
political agency. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between signifying
and a-signifying components, as well as Simondon’s notions of transindividuation, he
seeks to “grasp the evolution of the hacktivist DDoS from a collective human action
that uses specialized software tools to achieve specific political ends to a process of
transindividuation that is activated by unspecialized network resources.”45 From this
perspective, it appears that the use of non-voluntary botnets for hacktivist purposes
has “reversed the relationship between collective subjectivation and technological
efficiency.”46 Rather than establishing a functional relationship between existing
political struggles and technical means to promote this struggle, technicity itself
becomes the site of politics.
Breakdown and visibility
Following Desiriis’ argument, DDoS attacks can, thus, be interpreted as a struggle
about technicity:
In this respect, Anonymous may well be the name of an emerging
koiné, a new lingua franca whereby the machines’ openness to the

Robin Celikates and Daniel de Zeeuw, “Botnet Politics, Algorithmic Resistance and Hacking
Society”, in Hacking Habitat: Art of Control, ed. Ine Gevers (Utrecht: Niet Normaal Foundation, 2016),
209-17, 217.
43
Robbie Fordyce, “DDoS Attacks as Political Assemblages”, Platform 5, no. 1 (2013): 6-20. Other versions
of these arguments are brought forward by Evgeny Morozov, “Pro-WikiLeaks Denial of Service
Attacks: Just Another Form of Civil Disobedience.”, Slate Magazine, December 13, 2010,
https://slate.com/technology/2010/12/pro-wikileaks-denial-of-service-attacks-just-another-form-ofcivil-disobedience.html; Cory Doctorow, “We Need a Serious Critique of Net Activism”, The
Guardian,
January
25,
2011,
sec.
Technology,
https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2011/jan/25/net-activism-delusion.
44
Deseriis, “Hacktivism”, 145.
45
Deseriis, “Hacktivism”, 136.
46
Deseriis, “Hacktivism”, 146.
42
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surrounding milieu meets the human belief that defending such
openness works in the service of a freer society.47
This perspective shares many concerns with debates in infrastructure studies that
focus on the “enabling environments”48 that are taken for granted during times of
‘normal’ operation. As John Durham Peters states, infrastructure is usually “full of
inertia,” but at the same time remains “open to sabotage.”49 Moments of crisis or
breakdown are considered to be privileged vantage points for those studying
infrastructure, because of their potential to reveal aspects that usually escape
attention.
Many contributions in the field refer to the seminal list of characteristics of
infrastructure developed by Star and Ruhleder, including the assertion that
infrastructure “becomes visible upon breakdown.”50 If infrastructure has a tendency to
fade into the background, a key question is what kind of strategies can help in
rendering it visible – what Bowker and Star have conceptualised as “infrastructural
inversion.”51 What is special about breakdown in this sense is that it not only allows
researchers to observe socio-technical constellations in a state of uncertainty and
negotiability, but also confronts ordinary users, i.e. those relying on the infrastructure
in question, with the fragility of their enabling environments – “the server is down,
the bridge washes out, there is a power blackout.”52 While such moments of disruption
might be experienced as irritating, they are also illuminating. As Jackson puts it,
“Breakdown disturbs and sets in motion worlds of possibility that disappear under
the stable or accomplished form of the artifact.”53
However, the strong association between breakdown and visibility that runs
through infrastructure research54 has also been subject to qualifications. In a recent
Deseriis, “Hacktivism”, 146.
John Durham Peters, The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media (Chicago, London:
University of Chicago Press, 2015), 3.
49
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50
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(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), 34.
52
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(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2014), 221-39, 230.
54
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contribution to the debate, Seberger and Bowker question the premise that failure is
an observable quality of an object, because this perspective disregards the role of
human subjectivity in experiencing the visibility of infrastructure.55 They highlight
the fact that instances of “hyper-functionality” can be equally disturbing and are, thus,
revealing from a subjective point of view. By broadening the range of human
experiences that potentially contribute to the awareness of infrastructure, they seek
to arrive at an understanding of breakdown that is not tied to “objectival visibility.”56
A different critique is developed in a seminal paper by Graham and Thrift.57
Questioning the premise that breakdown appears in the form of extraordinary events,
they seek to shift focus towards small and everyday instances of failures that they
consider inherent to infrastructures. By assuming brokenness and decay, rather than
smooth functionality, as the status quo, they seek to highlight the role of maintenance
and repair that usually receives little attention. By focusing on the human labour that
is necessary to keep infrastructures functional, this perspective also helps to grasp the
profoundly sociotechnical nature of infrastructure, rather than seeing it as primarily
technical arrangements. Jackson points out how this shift of focus, “draws our
attention around the sociality of objects forward, into the ongoing forms of labor,
power, and interest – neither dead nor congealed – that underpin the ongoing survival
of things as objects in the world.”58
Both kinds of qualifications – the integration of subjective experience and the
integration of maintenance and repair – thus seek to broaden the horizon of what can
be considered as breakdown. They also tie in with a stronger orientation of the field
towards process and practices reflected in the shift of terminology from
infrastructures to “infrastructuring.”59 However, scholarly contributions that more
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explicitly focus on the role of temporality in infrastructure have hitherto mostly been
confined to the field of anthropology and urban geography.60
DDoS as breakdown
There is, thus, an emerging debate about the relationship between breakdown and
visibility within the broader field of infrastructure studies. As a specific kind of
breakdown of communication infrastructure, DDoS attacks are a relevant
phenomenon to consider in this regard. Accordingly, similar questions have been
raised in this field of research, for example by Sauter:
A direct action DDoS seeks to strip away the attractive, humanized
facade to reveal a corporate target’s reality as black boxed and
monolithic, fundamentally unresponsive (metaphorically and
actually) to human concerns.61
In this sense, the temporary crisis of communication is ascribed a potential to reveal,
to open up for scrutiny and to open up for new possibilities. Beck strikes a similar
chord when discussing the deterritorialising effect of DDoS attacks and pointing out
how these “changed belief structures, produced new knowledge, spawned physical
protests, and made local oppressive actions visible globally.”62 Breakdown plays a
similar role in Desiriis’ argument, which, with a more sociotechnical focus, revolves
around the “margin of indetermination of machines and living beings.”63 In his
argument, botnets and Anonymous itself are seen as sociotechnical amalgamations
that raise the question of indetermination. However, it is the breakdown of
communication induced by DDoS attacks that represents the inflection point where
this negotiation of openness becomes visible.
When confronting these perspectives with the critique developed by Graham
and Thrift,64 it appears that DDoS research, too, is preoccupied with major failures at
the expense of mundane acts of maintenance. This is hardly surprising given the
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canonical cases that are discussed in the literature. Historically, the political use of
DDoS follows the logic of political campaigning by actively creating temporarily
disruptive events that trigger public and media attention – as reflected in the name
“Electronic Disturbance Theater.” As an intentionally created communication crisis
with a political agenda, it seems that the very essence of DDoS is its exceptionality.
However, when looking at the recent technological development of DDoS beyond the
canonical examples, the question of exceptionality becomes more complicated. In the
following section, the sketch of technical developments provided above will be used
as a basis for a more elaborate discussion of the relationship between exceptionality
and visibility.
DDoS becomes ordinary
As discussed, central aspects that are characteristic for the development of the DDoS
landscape are the growing complexity of motives and the automation and
consolidation of DDoS capabilities. These developments have contributed to DDoS
attacks becoming a persistent, rather than an exceptional phenomenon,65 and have
resulted in an increasing reliance of activist organisations on professional protection
services. Whereas the existing scholarship has primarily focused on DDoS as a tactic
employed by activist organisations, the shift towards DDoS as a persistent
phenomenon necessitates a stronger focus on how they are subjected to such attacks.
From being a tool in the hacktivist arsenal – as the periodisations discussed above
portray it – DDoS has turned into an aspect of the material infrastructural conditions
of online activism. This calls for a stronger engagement with the systemic
consequences of DDoS protection requirements and a critical investigation of the
actors providing such services.
A productive theoretical approach to guide such an investigation is developed
by Burkart and McCourt, who focus on the productive or systemic consequences of
hacking rather than on its exceptional or disruptive qualities.66 A key argument in
their analysis, based on a political economy perspective, is that hacking creates
particular kinds of economic risks. Systemically speaking, “the market processes these
risks by commodifying them.”67 The authors point towards the global increase in
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cybersecurity spending, which indicates a growing market for both cybersecurity tools
and services and insurance against hacking losses as well as increasing venture capital
that flows into cybersecurity companies.
While their analysis focuses on hacking in general, the core argument holds
for DDoS attacks as well. For companies, the inaccessibility of content due to a DDoS
attack, even if it is temporary, poses a direct financial risk. For activist or journalistic
websites, DDoS attacks represent a risk that relevant information is withheld from
public debate. In both cases, DDoS attacks can also negatively impact on
organisations’ reputation, economy and public support. Providers of commercial
DDoS protection seize upon this opportunity, marketing their services towards larger
corporations that are prepared to invest substantially in IT security. Actors that are
considered to be leading in this particular field are Akamai, Cloudflare, Imperva and
Radware.68 The increase of Cloudflare’s market capitalisation from 5 billion dollars in
2019 to 23 billion dollars in 2020 gives an indication of the growing relevance of this
form of “risk processing.” According to a 2019 forecast, the global market for DDoS
protection and mitigation is expected to almost double from 2.4 billion in 2019 to 4.7
billion in 2024.69
DDoS protection services rely on a combination of different techniques for
identifying and filtering out malicious traffic. This is increasingly done as a service
and on the network level, which implies that the owner of a website agrees to route
all incoming traffic through the servers of the protection provider. There, the traffic
is analysed in order to identify patterns that can be linked to known attacks,
sometimes also involving assessments of individual IP addresses’ reputation. Scale is a
significant aspect in this regard, since the performance of filtering mechanisms can
be improved by analysing large amounts of attack data, especially when these
mechanisms are based on Machine Learning. But scale is also an advantage when it
comes to the size of the provider’s network. For example, the Content Delivery
Networks of Akamai and Cloudflare play an increasingly central role for the
distribution of large files across the web, e.g., for streaming services, by means of
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redundant local storing and dedicated private networks.70 However, their bandwidth
capacities, along with high flexibility when it comes to traffic management, also
provides effective measures against DDoS attacks.71
The commercial offerings of these protection providers are out of reach for
under-resourced NGOs. They therefore rely on free versions of protection services,
sometimes involving limits on the volume of attack traffic that is processed.
Cloudflare has gained a dominant position in this field by offering free basic DDoS
protection services without volume limitations. There are also more comprehensive
free protection programmes specifically geared towards human rights organisations
and journalistic outlets, such as Google’s “Project Shield”72 and Cloudflare’s “Project
Galileo.”73 Similar advanced protection programmes for independent media
organisations and NGOs are offered by non-commercial providers such as eQualitie74
and Qurium.75
Even if NGOs, thus, have a number of options to choose from, they have,
structurally speaking, become dependent on the free DDoS protection services
provided by the above companies and organisations. The fact that the market for
DDoS protection is dominated by few actors and that scale favours the largest ones,
raises concerns about growing market concentration in this area.
The politics of infrastructuring
The discussion above points towards a different relationship between breakdown and
visibility than is usually envisaged in infrastructure studies. Rather than holding a
potential for increased visibility, DDoS attacks have – by shifting from exceptional
events to perpetual crisis – contributed to the establishment of new intermediaries in
the form of DDoS protection providers. As an ever-larger part of internet traffic is
being routed through the networks of these intermediaries, it is affected by centrally
implemented decision mechanisms that remain opaque to the average user.
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This development clearly diverges from earlier incarnations of internet
infrastructure that spawned hopes of self-organisation76 and “fringe intelligence.”77
These hopes were especially tied to the end-to-end principle, where routing and
control functions are performed by adaptive decision mechanisms at the edges of the
network, whereas the core merely transmits according to basic rules.78 Even if
historical investigations point toward the need to nuance this picture,79 there is an
observable shift in how traffic is being processed and analysed. Rather than the
“nonsynchronous optimization” of the earlier internet that “prefers to leave the
optimal unsettled,”80 the current situation is, according to McKelvey, characterised by
“polychronous optimization”81 that is technically administered by “intermediary
daemons.” Ever more fine-grained information about what kinds of traffic are being
transported supplies these intermediaries with criteria for “micro-decisions”82 about
the routing of data: “The unsettled metastability of the internet is replaced by a
regulated system of service guarantees and data limits. The diagram shifts from the
edges to the core, with infrastructures progressively taking on greater management
capacities.”83
The growing reliance on DDoS protection services is, thus, part of a general
development towards traffic management mechanisms that remain opaque to users –
and, as such, a new kind of infrastructural invisibility. Taking the long-term
consequences of DDoS attacks into consideration, therefore, provides a more
comprehensive picture of the power relations emerging from the use of such attacks.
This suggests that, when discussing the legitimacy and effectivity of DDoS, it does not
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suffice to focus on particular political constellations; rather, there is a need to also
reflect upon their impact on an infrastructural level.
What this change of perspective implies is to pay closer attention to the
different kinds of temporality involved in DDoS attacks, including a reassessment of
established notions of breakdown and visibility. The maintenance approach in
infrastructure studies can be seen as one step in this direction. Contrasting an
emphasis on the eventfulness of large-scale ruptures with a more process-oriented
focus on decay and repair helps to recognise different modes of temporality involved
in communication breakdown. Yet, the protection provided by services such as
Cloudflare hardly fit the description of small-scale and ad-hoc maintenance. The
traffic management performed by these providers is rather systematic, centralised and
globally coordinated. Therefore, following Holt, such intermediaries cannot merely
be considered “connecting agents or messy middlemen – they are in many cases key
infrastructures and primary agents of power.”84
DDoS protection represents an emerging kind of infrastructure that does not
become visible upon breakdown, but rather thrives on it. A promising approach to
explore this relationship could be to abandon visuality as a guiding metaphor. As
Carmi convincingly argues, sound and listening metaphors are a more apt choice
when seeking to theorise persistent forms of communication crises, especially those
re-appearing in certain patterns or rhythms. According to her, reoccurring patterns
of “media distortions” engender forms of “processed listening” that seek to measure,
categorise and filter “deviant” behaviour:
when specific bodies, behaviors and rhythms interfere with media
companies’ business model(s), they illegitimize them and filter,
remove, delete, and reduce them. They become noise, disturbance,
deviant, and spam.85
While Carmi does mention DDoS attacks in passing, an elaborated account of DDoS
protection as a form of “processed listening” remains a desiderate. Thinking of these
intermediaries as forms of listening would help to refocus attention to forms of
temporality other than the event – the progressive weaving of measurement
capabilities into the infrastructure of the internet, the continuous adaptation of
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filtering rules to recurring patterns identified in traffic analysis and the gradual
persuasion of website owners to become accustomed to their reliance on protection.
Conclusions
This paper has focused on crises of communication caused by current forms of DDoS
attacks and has highlighted the need to reflect upon the different temporal
dimensions of such attacks. In a more immediate sense, a successful DDoS attack
disrupts the exchange of data between clients and servers, thus rendering content
inaccessible. Depending on the political constellations involved, this can have a
revealing impetus, in the sense that it focuses attention on specific political questions.
It can also create a sense of technicity, i.e. bringing the openness and negotiability of
technical constellations to the fore. However, when these kinds of breakdown become
ordinary, they rather appear as detrimental to visibility, elevating protection
providers into an intermediary position where they decide about the accessibility of
content, thus introducing opaque mechanisms of traffic management.
Acknowledging these long-term effects of DDoS attacks allows for a more
comprehensive understanding of their role, both in terms of hacktivist tactics and in
terms of infrastructural developments. Hacktivism research that focuses on DDoS as
a political tactic seems preoccupied with the immediate political impact of specific
attacks. This comes at the expense of their more systemic infrastructural
consequences. Integrating further temporal perspectives could help to better
understand the interrelationship between specific, situated attacks and the broader
economic and technological structures that they bring about. Broadening the horizon
in this way seems especially important when discussing the legitimacy of DDoS
attacks. To put it bluntly: How relevant is the immediately perceivable effect of
current DDoS attacks compared to the behind-the-scenes infrastructural adjustments
that they trigger? Depending on the (empirical) answer to this question, many
arguments that have been brought forward in favour of DDoS as a political tactic
might have to be re-evaluated.
On a more abstract level, the paper has highlighted the need to reflect upon
different forms of temporality when theorising the relationship between breakdown
and infrastructure. As a kind of communication crisis, DDoS points to the fact that
certain kinds of persistent breakdown render infrastructure opaque, rather than
allowing revealing insights. Focusing on the way that repetitive patterns of
interference contribute to long-term infrastructural transformations holds the
potential of broadening analyses of power relations in current media environments.
Programmatically speaking, it is also a call to explore a greater variety of temporal
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